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Freedom in the Workplace? 
Introduction 
Most of us in the United States will spend our adult lives 
working for a living. During that time you will probably 
face important decisions. You might, for example, have to 
decide whether to accept a job offer or remain a full-time 
student. You might be conflicted about accepting a very 
low-paying service job just because it cannot be outsourced 
abroad. Or you might want to reject an offer because the 
employer does not provide health insurance or day care 
for your children. As an employee you might think twice 
about joining a labor union if your employer might fire 
you and it would be difficult to find another job in the 
current labor market.1 
These decisions are made in what many thinkers (such 
as philosophers and social scientists) call a "free market." 
Of course, they acknowledge that our capitalist market is 
not completely free. Workers, for example, are prohibited 
by law from violating contracts with their employers, and 
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employers are not legally free to discriminate by race 
and sex. 
However, it is said by many thinkers that despite some 
limitations workers in our capitalist labor marke t enjoy 
great freedom. They are free to accept or refuse employer 
offers, and as employees they are free to remain in a job or 
quit. 
It is true that some workers are fortunate enough 
financially to exercise such freedom. But a great many do 
not have that freedom. P u t yourself in the position of these 
individuals: 
1. An employee wants to blow the whistle on the owner 
of his plant who violates the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act (OSHA). The employee knows that condi-
tions in the plant are harmful to those who work there, 
but he also knows that if he were to report the violation, 
the owner would (illegally) ensure that he is blacklisted 
in the industry. The worker's family depends on his 
wages, and he knows that he would have practically no 
chance of obtaining another position. 
2. An impoverished, unemployed worker is offered a job 
that barely pays enough to feed himself and his family. 
The employer tells him, "Take it or leave it. Plenty of 
people would take this job." The unemployed person ac-
cepts the offer as the lesser evil to continued joblessness. 
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3. An ailing worker remains in her exhausting job because 
she and her diabetic children desperately need the 
health insurance the job provides. 
Many thinkers would disagree as to whether the workers 
in these three cases are free or unfree. And how would the 
workers involved feel about their freedom or unfreedom? 
Take the worker who is threatened with being black-
listed if he blows the whistle on his employer. Given that 
his family depends on his wages, is he free to blow that 
whistle? The worker would not think so and neither do I. 
Yet there are some philosophers who would disagree. 
What of the impoverished, unemployed person who is 
offered a job that barely supports his family? The unem-
ployed person surely would regard himself as unfree to 
refuse this offer and I agree with him. Yet the fact is many 
philosophers would regard him as free to do so. 
The ailing worker who remains at her exhausting job 
for the health insurance she needs for her diabetic children 
surely believes that she is unfree to leave her position and I 
agree with her. Yet there are some philosophers and social 
scientists who would regard even her as enjoying the free-
dom found in capitalist society. 
What workers themselves believe about their own 
freedom or unfreedom may not be the whole truth of the 
matter, but it is often closer to the truth than the views held 
by many theorists. 
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Important ethical issues are at work here. I shall suggest 
that the unfreedom of the three workers discussed above— 
and many like them—is wrongful. You may find yourself 
in situations where, contrary to some philosophers, you 
think of yourself as unfree and forced into a certain action. 
In the following pages, I shall explore such situations in 
depth. Let us begin with the meaning of freedom itself and 
then go on to forcing, using examples to show the reality 
of both. 
CHAPTER I 
The Obstacle Concept of Freedom 
When is a person free or unfree to do (or not do) some-
thing?* 
Let us follow the lead of Gerald C. McCallum Jr. He 
suggested that a person is free to do something (or not) 
when there are no obstacles, such as constraints, restric-
tions, or interfering conditions, which prevent her from 
doing something (or not). A person is unfree when there 
are such obstacles. (Hereafter, I refer to this as the obstacle 
concept.)1 If the obstacle is not mentioned, it is usually 
understood from the context. 
No one is simply free or unfree. One is frttfrom an 
obstacle preventing someone from doing something (or 
not). One is unfree to do something (or not) because an 
obstacle prevents someone from doing it (or not). 
* The concept of freedom and unfreedom developed here has no 
bearing on the metaphysical concept of free will. 
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Take the women production line workers at a Nabisco 
plant who were unfree to use the restroom. The obstacle 
to such use was a three-day suspension. Ordered to 
urinate in their clothes, they resorted to wearing diapers, 
incontinence pads, or less expensive toilet paper and 
Kotex—"protection" that is harmful when drenched with 
urine. 
Workers at the plant, including men with serious 
kidney problems were unfree to use the restroom without 
permission. The obstacle to such use without first getting 
permission was suspension.2 
Becoming Free 
Suppose that the lack of day care at time tl is an obstacle 
that renders a mother unfree to work. But day care be-
comes available to her at a later time, tl. Day care removes 
the obstacle to her working and she becomes free to do so. 
Her becoming free at time t2 implies that she was unfree 
before at time t l . 
Suppose at time t l , a supervisor threatens a woman 
employee: if she complains about his sexual harassment he 
will not recommend her for the pay raise she badly needs 
to support her children. At time tl the prospect of no pay 
raise is an obstacle that makes her unfree to complain. 
But at time t2, her union informs the employer about the 
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supervisor's threat. Because of the union action on her 
behalf at time t2, she becomes free to complain about his 
sexual harassment. The union zctionfreed her from the 
obstacle of the supervisor's threat. 
Before 1964 blacks were unfree by law to sit at lunch 
counters with whites in the South. But in 1964 the Civil 
Rights Act freed them from that legal impediment. They 
became legally free to do so. 
Active and Inactive Freedom and Unfreedom 
A person's freedom and unfreedom shifts with time, as 
obstacles appear and disappear. For example, an obstacle to 
someone's living outside of a forced labor camp is created 
when she is brought into the camp. She is unfree to live 
outside the camp. If she is released the obstacle is removed 
and she becomes free to live on the outside. 
It seems that, according to my view, I am free and un-
free relative to countless obstacles. For example, travel to 
distant solar systems is physically impossible. Am I unfree 
to do so? Yet such travel has no relevance to my life. It 
seems odd to include it in a list of my unfreedoms. 
Suppose such travel becomes physically possible. If I 
become free to engage in such travel at t2,1 must have been 
unfree before at t l . Yet such freedom and unfreedom at tl 
had no significance for me. 
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Let us distinguish two kinds of freedom and two kinds 
of unfreedom: active and inactive. My unfreedom now to 
travel to distant solar systems is inactive since such travel 
is not relevant to my life. (Relevance to my life includes 
relevance to my desires, wants, plans, and obligations.) 
If traveling to distant solar systems becomes physically 
possible and relevant to my life then my unfreedom to 
do so would become active. Of course, if I were now a 
space explorer who yearns to do the impossible—travel 
to distant solar systems—such travel, even if impossible, 
would be relevant to my life and I would be actively 
unfree to do so. 
In what follows, unless otherwise specified, freedom and 
unfreedom are active. 
Free and Unfree 
One may be free and unfree at the same time to do a 
specific act relative to different obstacles. Suppose, for ex-
ample, an employer asks his observant Jewish employee to 
work on the Sabbath. The worker may be free, relative to 
the nation's law, to work on the Sabbath but unfree relative 
to his religious prohibitions. 
The fact that one may be free and unfree at the same 
time to do a specific action, relative to different obstacles is, 
as we shall see, important. 
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Kinds of Freedom and Unfreedom 
A person may be physically unfree when her unfreedom 
is due to a purely physical obstacle. Thus a miner work-
ing in a cave is physically unfree to leave if the only exit is 
blocked by a naturally caused avalanche. My main focus 
in subsequent chapters, however, is not on physical but 
on social freedom and social unfreedom. In such cases the 
relevant obstacles significantly involve persons. 
Whether social freedom or unfreedom is political, legal, or 
economic corresponds to the type of obstacle. Thus legal free-
dom to do something is the absence of legal obstacles to doing 
it. A worker is legally free to organize a union if there is no 
law such as the National Labor Relations Act prohibiting it. 
(Later I shall claim that the NLRA is a "toothless" law.) 
Freedom as Morally Good 
Is freedom always morally good? 
Not always. The freedom of a murderer to escape, given 
the consequences of such freedom, is usually morally bad. 
The freedom of a person to express her opinions is usually 
morally good. 
To determine whether a person's freedom is good or 
bad, we have to look at the context and consequences of 
such freedom. 
CHAPTER II 
Criticism of the Obstacle Concept of Freedom 
Criticism of the obstacle concept of freedom might be 
made by two different kinds of philosophers, and I call 
their views Narrow Interference and Broad Interference. 
Narrow Interference 
Suppose that an immigrant worker is locked in a van by a 
human agent, called a "coyote," who is transporting him. 
The agent has made it physically impossible for the worker 
to leave. This kind of unfreedom in which a person makes 
it physically impossible for someone to do something is 
called restraint. According to Narrow Interference philoso-
phers, restraint is the only kind of unfreedom.1 
Broad Interference 
Suppose an employee worked over forty hours and is there-
fore entitled to additional pay for overtime. Her employer 
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threatens to fire her unless she alters her time card to show 
less than forty hours worked. Because she needs her job 
desperately in order to support her children, she agrees. 
(For discussion of actual cases of shaving time, see pp. 25—26.) 
Note that it is not physically impossible for her to refuse 
to comply with her employer's threat. She is not restrained 
by anyone. Hence, according to Narrow Interference, she 
is free to say no. 
But Broad Interference philosophers would disagree. 
They would claim that, since she is coerced—threatened— 
she is not free to say no.2 According to Broad Interference 
philosophers, both restraint and coercion create unfreedom. 
Only restraint and coercion render individuals unfree. 
How might these two kinds of philosophers—Narrow 
and Broad Interference—criticize the obstacle concept of 
freedom developed in the previous chapter? Let us focus 
on two cases: 
First, at time tl a miner, Joe, is trapped in a cave by an 
unforeseen, naturally caused avalanche that prevents him 
from leaving. 
Second, at time t l , an impoverished farm worker, Nita, 
lacks the means—sufficient money—to support her family 
decently. 
According to the obstacle concept, although the ava-
lanche is a purely physical obstacle, it renders the miner 
unfree to leave. Note that this miner is not restrained as no 
person has made it physically impossible for him to leave 
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the cave. Nor is he coerced (threatened) into remaining 
in the cave. Thus, according to both Narrow and Broad 
Interference, while at time tl he is incapable of leaving, he 
is free to do so. 
I suggest that contrary to both Narrow and Broad In-
terference, the trapped miner inside the cave, Joe, is unfree 
to leave at time t l . Here is why. Suppose that at time t2, 
the obstacle—the avalanche—to his leaving is removed. 
Hence, at time t2, he becomes free to leave. If he becomes 
free at t2, he must have been unfree to leave before at time 
tl when the avalanche blocked his exit. 
It may be argued that the trapped miner is neither free 
nor unfree. But in that case what are people doing when 
they free him? Note also that such purely physical unfree-
dom has moral implications. At least some people (rescue 
workers) are morally obligated to rescue him. 
I conclude that, contrary to Narrow and Broad Inter-
ference, a purely physical obstacle may render a person 
unfree. 
Let us turn now to the impoverished farm worker, 
Nita, who lacks the means—sufficient money—to support 
her family decently. Her poverty is not due to restraint or 
coercion—her employer is not threatening her—but to the 
low-wage policy of her employer's agribusiness. Also, Nita 
has no chance of a better job. 
According to the obstacle concept, Nita is unfree to 
support her family decently. The obstacle to such support 
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is lack of money. But a Narrow Interference philosopher 
would note that no person has restrained Nita—making 
it physically impossible for her to support her family. A 
Broad Interference philosopher would add that Nita is not 
coerced either since no person has threatened her. Hence, 
according to both Narrow and Broad Interference views, 
Nita is not unfree to support her family. They claim that 
lack of the means—sufficient money to support her family 
decently—does not exemplify unfreedom to do so. 
Contrary to both Narrow and Broad Interference, I sug-
gest that Nita is unfree to support her family. Here is why. 
At time t l , Nita cannot support them. But, suppose that 
at a later time t2, she gets a better job. Nita now has the 
means to support her family decently. This acquisition of 
the means at t2 to do so frees her, liberates her from her t l 
poverty. At t2 she becomes free from her tl poverty. Hence, 
contrary to Broad and Narrow Interference, she must 
have been unfree at tl when—although not coerced or 
restrained—Nita lacked the means to support her family. 
Let us turn now to other concepts of freedom that are 
different from the obstacle concept. 
Moralized Concepts of Freedom 
According to David Miller, "Constraints on freedom are 
those obstacles for which other human beings can be held 
morally responsible"3 (emphasis added). However, as I have 
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argued above, the miner trapped in the cave is rendered 
unfree to leave by an avalanche, although no human agent 
is morally responsible for this purely physical constraint on 
his freedom. 
Robert Nozick holds a different moralized view of free-
dom: "Other people's actions place limits on one's available 
opportunities. Whether this makes one's resulting action 
non-voluntary [unfree] depends upon whether these others 
had the [moral] right to act as they did.'"1 
However, as G. A. Cohen points out, Nozick's moral-
ized account, "has the absurd upshot that if a criminal's 
imprisonment is morally justified, he is then not forced to 
be in prison."5 
Freedom as Available Choice 
Some philosophers argue that being free to do something 
means having an available choice to do it. Being unfree 
means having no available choice to do so.6 
But suppose an individual is unfree by law at tl to leave 
the country. A legal obstacle—a law—prevents her from 
leaving. If the legal obstacle is removed at t2 she becomes 
free to leave. Thus when the obstacle to her leaving is re-
moved she acquires an available choice to leave. 
Hence, if a person is free to do something she does 
have an available choice to do it. But she has that available 
choice because no obstacle prevents her from doing it. 
CHAPTER III 
Social Forcing 
We are all familiar with the claim that a person is forced 
to do something (or not). Most people are forced to work 
because they need their pay. But there are different kinds 
of forcing. 
Let us look at one type of forcing: restraint. 
Restraint 
Here is an actual case: poor young women worked over 
eighteen hours a day in a Los Angeles suburban sweatshop 
whose employer ordered the door locked and the yard 
encircled with a twelve-foot fence topped with razor wire. 
Hence, it was physically impossible for the women to leave. 
They had no choice but to remain inside.1 
Generally speaking, when a person renders it physically 
impossible for another individual to do something (or not), 
then that individual is restrained by the person who did so. 
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Note that a human being—the employer in the sweat-
shop case—is significantly involved in restraining these 
workers. Hence, the kind of forcing that this restraint case 
exemplifies is social forcing. 
In what follows we shall focus our attention on cases of 
social forcing. In all of these cases, unless specified other-
wise, the persons involved in doing or creating such forc-
ing are able to choose not to do so. 
Most philosophers agree that persons who are restrained 
are unfree. However, such agreement does not exist for a 
different kind of social forcing. 
Social Forcing with Alternatives 
Suppose a retail store supervisor, Phillip, tells Maria, an 
employee who suffers from chronic bronchitis, to accept 
lower pay for the same work or be reduced to a part-
time assignment. As a part-time worker she would lose 
her health insurance, which she needs desperately. (Like 
temporary workers, part-time employees usually lack 
employer-sponsored health insurance.)2 For Maria, the 
loss of health insurance is a greater evil than the alterna-
tive of reduced full-time pay. Hence, she complies with 
her boss's threat. The alternatives facing Maria are a lesser 
and a gietuei evil. She has no choice but to accept the lesser 
rather than the greater evil. 
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In cases of social forcing with alternatives, the indivi-
duals who are so forced are rational. They have only two 
alternatives because other alternatives are either worse 
than the ones they are facing or because the probability of 
achieving them is close to zero. 
Recall that in the Los Angeles sweatshop, which exem-
plified restraint, it is physically impossible for the fenced-in 
young women to leave. In social forcing with alternatives, 
however, it is not physically impossible for these individuals 
to act on either alternative. Thus it is not physically impos-
sible for Maria to refuse to accept the full-time work with 
reduced pay or to accept the transfer to part-time work. 
There are two kinds of social forcing with alternatives. 
The first, proposal forcing, is illustrated by Maria's situation, 
in which she is forced to comply with her employer's threat 
rather than lose her health insurance. 
A second kind is systemic forcing, which we shall exam-
ine later in chapter 5. 
Proposal Forcing 
In proposal forcing, an individual receives a proposal from 
an identifiable person, such as an employer (or employer's 
agent), which that individual is forced to accept as the 
lesser evil to a greater evil alternative. Proposal forcing can 
be either strong or wea\. 
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Strong Proposal Forcing 
The case of Maria illustrates strong proposal forcing 
because her alternatives are either transferring to part-
time work without health insurance (the greater evil) or 
remaining full-time with reduced pay (the lesser evil). 
The greater evil results in an unacceptable level of hard-
ship, so the individual is forced to accept the lesser evil. 
This type of strong proposal forcing is called a hardship 
case. Hardship refers to one of the following: serious ad-
versity, privation, lack of access to necessary means of life, 
misery, suffering (mental or physical), harm or the risk 
of harm, or significant sacrifice for the self, dependents 
or loved ones. I shall, for the sake of simplicity (possibly 
despite ordinary language), include the prospect of death 
as a hardship. 
Another type of strong proposal forcing case is the rights 
case. 
Rights Cases 
For example, an employer orders an employee, George, 
to "stop organizing a union in my plant or I'll cut your 
wages." George is resentful because he believes his em-
ployer has no right—moral or legal—to stop him from 
organizing a union, an act which is unrelated to his job 
performance. But George cannot support his children on 
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lower wages; hence, he complies with his employer's threat. 
For George, compliance is the lesser evil compared with 
the greater evil of reduced wages. 
Such threats in violation of the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) are common in industry today (see page 21). 
I shall refer to both hardship and rights cases as lesser evil 
cases, in which a person such as George has no choice but to 
accept the alternative that exemplifies the lesser rather than 
the greater evil. I shall assume, unless otherwise specified, 
that in lesser evil cases people such as George have a right to 
accept the lesser evil. (Later in this chapter, I shall indicate 
the laws and policies that contribute to the vulnerability of 
workers to strong proposal forcing.) 
Wea\ Forcing 
In wea\ proposal forcing a person does not choose between 
two hardships. For example, a person from a well-off 
family is only weakly forced to work as a CEO because he 
wants the status. But being forced to work is not usually 
weak. For most people work is a hardship they endure 
because it is not as bad as the hardship of starvation. 
There are, of course, varieties of forcing that are 
between strong and weak forcing, but we shall not pursue 
them. In the following, unless specified otherwise, we shall 
consider only strong forcing. 
